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vContracting for Canola in the Great Plain States
Abstract:
Canola has become an important crop in the last decade in the U.S.  Production of canola
is risky and competes with other crops which have a range of risk reduction mechanisms. 
Alternative contracting strategies were evaluated by comparing returns to labor and management
for growers and gross margins for processors.  Alternative contracting strategies included no
contract, fixed price with and without act of god provisions, and an oil premium contract. 
Grower returns and processor gross margins were simulated and resulting distributions were
evaluated using stochastic efficiency with respect to a function.  We estimated certainty
equivalents and ranked contract preferences for both growers and processors by region in North
Dakota.  Grower and processor risk preferences varied by region.  Producers and processors
preferences differed for contract alternatives in the Northwest, Northeast and Eastcentral regions
and were in agreement in the Northcentral region.  This suggests that development of a single
contract that would be widely adopted across the state would likely have to be altered by region
to be acceptable to growers and processors.
Key Words: Canola, Grower, Processor, Contracting, Risk, Stochastic Efficiency (SERF).Contracting for Canola in the Great Plains States
Introduction
During the past decade canola has evolved to be an important crop in the Great Plains of
the United States.  Area planted has increased from virtually nil in the early 1990s to about 1
million acres in more recent years, about 95% of which is grown in North Dakota.  Though US
canola production has grown rapidly, it remains small in comparison to Canadian canola which is
about 15 million acres and has had similar growth.  The difference is that in North Dakota there
are many more competing crops and canola in Canada provides an alternative to growers from
the more regulated wheat and barley marketing system.  Nevertheless, growth for both of these
crops has been facilitated by more advanced technologies, including genetic modification,
Liberty Link, and Clearfield technologies, as well as growth in demand due to it being a healthful
oil, and due to the growth in biodiesel demand both in Europe and in the United States.
Canola production however is risky, and there are many competing crops with varying
risk reduction mechanisms.  Earlier, there was limited use in contracts (pre-plant) with growers,
but, in recent years there has been an escalation in use of contracts in North Dakota, as well as in
Canada and Australia.  In North Dakota this is driven by the growth in demand for canola, the
battle for acres, risk in crop production and competing crop contracts along with their risk
mitigation provisions.  Of particular interest in the case of canola contracts is the lack of
provisions for oil premiums.  While use of premiums is a common practice in other crops and in
other oilseeds in the United States and Canola in Australia, at least traditionally it has not been
common in canola in North America.  Nevertheless, end-users are seeking ways to influence 
growers to increase oil content and oil-premiums are one means to provide such incentives. 
There are alternatives, one of which is the specification of variety requirements in a contract.  In
concept, a carefully selected set of approved or allowed varieties, which are known to be greater
in oil content could accomplish much the same.  Indeed, this is the current practice in North
Dakota.  But, it remains an important empirical question as to the type of contract that would be
most effective in improving oil content.  This is important to both growers and to processors
since for the latter, increased oil has substantial impacts on increasing processing margins.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze contract terms and alternatives for canola.  The
focus is on contracts between processors and growers in the North Dakota canola producing
region.  Specifically, we compare risks and returns to growers using different contracting and risk
reduction strategies.  We develop a crop budget for growers, and a processing budget for
processors and analyze risks and returns associated with alternative contracts.  We make specific
comparisons on the risks and returns to both growers and the processor of using a contract with
specified varieties, and one using  premiums/discounts for higher oil content.  These generate
very similar returns, and the results are mostly in the risk implied in the contract.  Separate
analysis are conducted in each of the four major producing regions in North Dakota.
The paper contributes to the growing recent literature on agricultural contracting
(MacDonald et al. 2004; Wilson and Dahl 2008 and 2009ab; and Wilson, Gustafson and Dahl
2009) and expands upon some of these ideas by quantifying risks and returns of alternativeprovisions to improve crop quality, in this case oil content.  In the first section below we discuss
factors impacting the growth in contracting.  Then, we provide a brief description of the canola
industry in North Dakota, as well as a description of alternative contracts.  Later sections
describe the empirical model and present the results.  The final section provides a summary of
results and implications for management and the industry. 
Growth in Contracting
The most recent broad based survey on contracting in agriculture (to our knowledge) was
done by MacDonald et al., (2004) who examined contracting of commodities in the U.S. in 2001
and compared use of contracts to that in various time periods.  They indicate that the number of
farms using contracts and value of production under contract increased from 1969 to 2001.  The
number of farms using contracts increased from 6% to 11% from 1969 to 2001 and the value of
production increased from 12% in 1969 to 36% in 2001.  They illustrate that the share of wheat
under contract increased from 6% of value in 1991-1993 to a high of 9% in 1996-1997 and
declined to 5% in 2001.  Most of the contracting of crops was focused in fruit, vegetables, rice,
sugar beets, and peanuts.  Contracts in crops were largely marketing contracts, while livestock
contained both marketing and production contracts.
MacDonald et al., (2004) conclude that the spot market is having difficulty providing
accurate price signals for products geared toward new consumer demands.  They indicate that
this trend for increased use of vertical coordination, through contracts and ownership will
continue.
More recently, it is our observation that contracting has escalated drastically.  While it is
difficult to document this without a broad-based survey, it is our observation that for some
commodities; pre-plant contracting has been adopted for more than 70% of industry demand, and
has now become common business practice in the industry.  We would attribute this to a
response to three important factors.  One is the battle for acres.  The second is the apparent
escalation in risk, as a result of the increase in volatility as described above.  Third is the
apparent deterioration of, or unavailability of, traditional hedging mechanisms for managing
risks.
Competition and the Battle for Acres:  Implications for Contracting
In part due to the growth in demands relative to supplies, and shifts in agronomic
technology and production practices, a battle for acres exists in many regions of United States
agriculture.  While in some states there are few cropping opportunities and the battle is not as
apparent, in North Dakota, as an example, growers in some regions have up to 12-16 different
crops that can be grown.  In fact, extension budgets normally contain returns for this many crops
(Swenson et al).  Some elevators now are posting prices for up to 12 crops at one time.  Finally,
it should be noted, that in this state the crops are apparently as diverse as any other state with the
exception of California.
2As a result of this, and the growth in GM row crops in non-traditional regions, there has
been a shift in production.  The response has been for an escalation in contracting.  As examples,
canola contracts have been offered with act-of-god clauses for prescribed varieties, and some
ethanol plants offered contracts for 3 years of corn production.  Most of the malting barley is now
bought on pre-plant contracts (Wilson, Gustafson and Dahl, 2009).  Some of these are offered up
to 14 months prior to harvest and there have been relaxed quality requirements.  Most of the
different types of sunflowers have extensive contracting mechanisms.  There has been lesser
contracting in durum wheat, but during 2007 contracts were offered in the spring for new crop
(pre-plant) delivery and during the 2008 contracting season contracts were offered with a record
premium relative to HRS wheat.  Many of the minor crops, including peas, edible beans,
Sunflower, NuSun, Vestive, etc. are all nearly 100% contracted.
Background on Canola and Contracting
Canola in North Dakota:
Compared to traditional crops in North Dakota, canola would be considered a new
cropping alternative.  However, it is not dissimilar from the numerous other crops that are
emerging.  Area planted has increased from near nil in the 1990s to about 1 million acres in
recent years (Figure 1).  As noted, though area planted in North Dakota is less than that in
Canada, North Dakota is by far the dominant producing state within the United States (Figure 2). 
Further, though Canada is also a very large producer, it has substantially increased crushing
capacity and other demands that puts downward pressure on the availability of canola for
shipments to the United States.
Figure 1.  North Dakota Canola Planted Area, 1991-2009.
3Though planted on smaller acreages than many other crops in the U.S. and North Dakota,
Canola is important for a number of reasons.  First, it provides attractive returns to growers in
some regions in which canola is suited agronomically.  Second, given the higher prices due to the
growth in demands in recent years, the returns have been greater than normal.  This ultimately
has a positive impact on competing crop prices since these crops have to compete for acres. 
Third, canola is an important rotation crop and provides positive agronomic benefits to
traditional small grains. Finally, several processors in North Dakota use Canola and having a
local supply is advantageous versus relying exclusively on imported feedstocks.
There are numerous varieties grown in North Dakota.  All are private varieties provided
by the major seed companies.  The composition of varieties changes over time with advances in
technology, and improvements in yields, oil content, disease resistance, etc.  Agronomic
technology plays an important role in several respects.   Most important is that the varieties are
now virtually all genetically modified with some form of herbicide resistance and development is
progressing on traits for nitrogen use efficiency.  The main groups of herbicide resistant canola
include Roundup Ready, Liberty Link, and Clearfield.  Roundup Ready and Liberty Link are
genetically modified (GM) canola varieties.  Clearfield is a non-GM herbicide tolerant cropping
system developed using traditional plant breeding.  Herbicide resistant canola provides improved
weed control and better yields.  According to the Canola Council of Canada (2005), growers
reported an average 10% yield increase for their GM canola compared to conventional canola in
a 2001 study.  GM canola was introduced in Canada in 1995, and accounted for approximately
80% of canola acres in Canada in 2005 (Canola Council of Canada 2005).  Initial trials on
nitrogen use efficiency suggests 20-30% increase in seed yield for the same level of nitrogen
fertilization or similar yields with 1/3 to 1/2 of the nitrogen used (Dansby, 2008). Oil types for
Figure 2.  U.S. and Canada Canola Planted Acres in 2007, by
County/Agricultural Region.
4varieties can be traditional oil type and high oleic type varieties.  Finally, there is a transition now
from the industry being dominated by open pollinated varieties to a rapid adoption of hybrid and
synthetic varieties.
In response to this there has been a general increase in yields.  The general trend in
average U.S. yields is for an increase of about 13.5 lbs/a/year over the period of 1991/92 to
2009/10, however, there has been a wide range variation in yields from year to year.
The oil and protein content of canola varies across varieties, regions, agronomic practice,
as well as through time.  Sample data obtained from the Northern Canola Growers Association
shows the performance of canola in North Dakota and Minnesota with regard to many of these
quality factors.  The average quality of these samples is presented in Table 1 for those years for 
 which the data are available.  An analysis of the sample data shows that there is a significant
tradeoff between oil content and protein content, as demonstrated in Figure 4.  The correlation
between oil content and protein content in the sample data is -0.77.
Figure 3.  U.S. Canola Yields, 1991/92-2009/10.
5Figure 4. Oil and Protein Content From North Dakota Canola Samples, 2002, 2004 and
2006.
Finally, it is important that oil content is generally lower in the U.S. than that produced in
Canada, but protein content has been higher.  Canola oil content in Canada in 2000- 2006
averaged 43.2% for No. 1 Canola versus about 41.2% for canola in North Dakota and Minnesota
(Figure 5) (Canada Grains Commission (1997-2009) and Coleman, 2007).  In contrast, for the
same period, protein content for Canadian canola averaged 21.8% versus 23.0% for North
Dakota and Minnesota (Figure 6).
Table 1. Quality of North Dakota and Minnesota Canola Crops
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Oil content*, % 41.4 41.1 40.4 40.1 41.5 42.6 41.0
Protein content*, % 21.9 22.9 24.0 23.4 22.5 22.0 24.4
Chlorophyll content, mg/kg 10.2 18.1 20.4 18.9 14.0
Total glucosinates*, umol/g 10.4 12.9 13.1 10.8 11.4
Free fatty acids, % in oil 0.61 0.65 NA NA NA
Erucic acid, % in oil 0.36 0.11 NA NA NA
Linolenic acid, % in oil 8.6 8 NA NA 7.7
Oleic acid, % in oil 64.4 64.1 NA NA 63.3
Total saturated fatty acids, % in oil 7.4 8 NA NA 7.2
Iodine value 109.21 107.63 NA NA 109.3
*8.5% moisture basis
NA=not available
6Figure 5.  Average Oil Content for Canada No. 1 Canola and North Dakota and Minnesota
Canola, 1997-2009.
Figure 6.  Average Protein Content for Canada No. 1 Canola and North Dakota and
Minnesota Canola, 1997-2009.
7Producing canola, like other crops, is risky.  Canola has traditional risks including price
and yield.  Price risk can be managed by hedging at Winnipeg, but there remains basis and
exchange rate risks.  Or, canola could be cross-hedged at Chicago (Flaskerud, Dahl and Wilson).
Finally, there are varying forms of contracts (discussed below) that can be used to mitigate price
risk.  In addition, there are agronomic risks related to shattering, disease to some extent, etc, and
there is risk associated with oil content which is random, but, can be impacted by variety
selection, and agronomic practices.  Taken together, the risks are important and ultimately
provide the motivations for developing alternative contracts.
Contracting and Canola:
There are three reasons why contracting has evolved to be important in Canola.  One is
that it is a risky crop and a contract provides a mechanism of risk sharing.  Second, contracts
provide a price signal about the future value of the commodity which is much more precise than
can be inferred through a futures or basis specification.  Finally, a contract can be used to
improve the quantity of a desired characteristic, in this case oil content.
Canola evolved as an industry in which contracting was not a dominant feature.  In recent
years, contracting has become more important and contract provisions have become more
strategic and stylized.  In North Dakota, one of the prevailing contract types is a contract in
which the variety is specified.  During the most recent couple of years, the dominant buyer in
North Dakota has offered, a pre-plant contract in which the grower would have to plant from a
list of approved varieties.  These are or have been specified as varieties typically having greater
yields and/or oil versus others.  In addition, payment prices vary by delivery period with prices
lower in the September-December time period and higher for April-July time frames.  This
provision is designed to spread deliveries throughout the year.   There are a number of other
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specific contract provisions including: 1) provide field description by June 15; 2) provide proof
of canola seed purchase of approved variety; 3) provide copy of Farm Service Agency form 578;
4) provide final yield report as soon as available, but before October 30; and 5) if these four
provisions not adhered to by specified dates, contract reverts to cash contract without Act-of-God
provisions.
Act-of-God (AOG) provisions have evolved to be very important in most crop
contracting, as in Canola.  Generally, most of the contracts, though not all, contain AOG
provisions.  Sometimes these clauses are offered without a price differential.  Examples are
shown in Table 2 below.  AOG provisions are common across crops but, they are by no means
standardized.  There are many different interpretations of AOG clauses.  Those most common
are: 1) a limit on the proportion of normal production or maximum contracted volume that can be
covered under AOG; 2) a price differential for AOG provisions; 3) information requirements in
order to verify yield losses which can include description of location of field and/or crop
 The contract has a first-right of refusal on production exceeding that contracted from the
1
field identified in the contract retained at market price (ADM).
8insurance adjustment assessments; 4) limitations on specific location to apply for contract
(requirement that contract applies only to crop produced on specific field identified in the
contract).  Specific crops may require specific varieties for contracts, these include amongst
others, malting barley and high oleic sunflowers and canola.  Contracts with AOG provisions
may also contain the first right of refusal on purchase of any volume exceeding the contracted
volume.
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$0.45/cwt 1000 lbs/a Variety Specific SunPrairie
An alternative would be some form of a contract with an explicit oil premium in a pre-
plant contract.  The concept would be that if growers had a greater than specified oil content, they
would receive a premium.  Growers could seek to achieve greater oil content by choice of
variety, agronomic techniques, amoung others.  In this type of contract, the grower is largely
bearing risks associated with not achieving the above-contract oil level.
Use of oil premium contracts is common in some of the other speciality oil crops.  As
examples: contracts for High Oleic Sunflowers provide premiums/discounts for oil content
over/under 40%.  Pates (2009) indicates that for High Oleic sunflowers, for 2009 Technology
Crops International Inc. offered contracts with a premium of $3/cwt over NuSun prices or
growers would be allowed to price up to 25% of the crop on the Chicago Soybean futures with
the remainder at $2/cwt over NuSun prices.  Reference is also frequently made to Canola in
Australia where it is common to use oil-premium contracts.  The Australian Oilseeds Federation,
(P. Salisbury and T. Potter, (1999)) indicate premiums/discounts for canola of 1.5% for each 1%
oil content over/under 40%.
9Canadian use of contracts in canola, particularly, pre-plant contracts is only now starting
to evolve with similar pressures to that in North Dakota.  It is not a common practice to use oil-
premium contracts in Canada.  In fact, upon recent clarification with oil traders in Canada, there
are not any oil premiums on generic canola.  There are production contracts which use a buyers
call which assures delivery from the grower to the grain buyer.  These production contract
premiums can range from $15 -$40 / mt.  Otherwise, there are a number of identity preserved (IP)
canola contracts.  The largest is Nexera  canola - a variety by Dow that is low in linolenic acid
TM
and high in oleic acid that allows the oil to be -0- trans fat.  Cargill Intermountain Canola has
developed a similar variety.  There is a Liberty Link type variety that is grown under IP
conditions that is non-transgenic and can be used for non-gmo applications.  There are also some
smaller programs that are specifically high-oil content Canola that aren't necessarily IP'd but run
with small premium programs as well.
Finally, these issues are ultimately important to canola crushers.  Contracts with  AOG
provisions impact processors by introducing uncertainty of supplies and increases risks
associated with both the cost and ability to purchase spot supplies to aleviate contract shortages. 
Contracts without AOG provisions shift these risks onto producers.  Variation in the quality of
canola delivered to processors (oil and meal content) affects the quantity of outputs (oil and
meal) processors can obtain which in turn impacts crushing margins.  Contracts with oil
premiums/discounts are a method of sharing benefits/costs of quality deviations between growers
and crushers.
Specification of Contract Provisions in this Study:
This study models risks and returns associated with different contract provisions in
Canola.  The focus is on variety contract specification vs, an oil premium specification.  This
section provides details behind the contracts that were modeled.
Four contract alternatives were modeled for growers and crushers that included 1) no
contract; 2) fixed price contract without AOG; 3) fixed price contract with AOG; and 4) an oil
premium contract for each of the four marketing regions (Northwest, Northcentral, Northeast and
Eastcentral).  The no contract alternative assumes that producers would hedge production with
futures at planting time and as such, only subject to basis risk.  Fixed price contracts assumed
contracts would be limited to the first 1000 pounds of production, with production exeeding the
contracted volume priced similar to the no contract alternative and for the contracts without
AOG, production shortages required to be purchased to fulfil the contract.  The oil premium
contract introduces a premium/discount paid to growers for oil content over/below 42%.  Payoffs
for both growers and processors were evaluated for each of the alternatives.
10Emperical Models
Payoff functions were defined for growers and processors for the four contracting
alternatives.  Payoff functions for growers were defined as net returns to labor and management
or returns over both fixed and direct costs.  Grower payoffs by contract alternative were defined
as follows for no contract, fixed price without AOG, fixed price with AOG and oil premium
contracts:
where   is random yield in region i, F is canola futures in $US dollar units (assumed hedged
both in futures for canola and the Canadian/US Dollar exchange rate),   is random basis at
i i i processor, T is transportation cost from production region i to the processing plant, DC and FC
are the direct and fixed costs for producing canola in region i, FP is fixed price offered for the
fixed price contracts, OP is the oil premium/discount as % of futures and   is the random
percent oil contained in canola produced in region I.
Processor Payoffs were defined as the gross crushing margin.  These payoffs for
processors were developed by contract alternative and are defined as follows for no contract,
fixed price without AOG, fixed price with AOG and oil premium contracts:
where PO is the price of canola oil, PM is the price of canola meal, and the rest are as previously
defined.
11Data
Direct and fixed costs for four multi-county planning regions (Northwestern,
Northcentral, Northeastern and Eastcentral North Dakota) for 2008 were obtained from Swenson
and Haugen (2007) for canola.
Relationships for yields and oil content were derived from North Dakota Variety Trial
Data for canola by variety from 2003-2007 (Kandel) and was limited to those varieties which had
at least 10 total observations (i.e, 2 locations for 5 years, 4 locations for 3 years, etc.). 
Relationships for yields for contracts included only a subset of varieties above that were specified
in the 2008 contract.  Relationships were estimated for yields and oil for all varieties and for
contract varieties utilizing binary variables for location and year (Table 3).  RMSE of regressions
was retained to allow incorporation of the error from regression relationships as an element of
yield and oil determination by marketing region in the simulation.  Distributions for error were
assumed normally distributed with mean of zero and standard deviation equal to the RMSE. In
the simulation, an average of annual effects was utilized for 2008.
12Table 3.  Estimated Relationships for Yields and Oil Content for All and Contract Varieties,
2003-2007.
All Varieties Contract Varieties





























































RMSE 403 1.90 402 1.83
R2 .60 .66 .61 .68
* t values for parameter estimates in ( ).
Contract prices for growers for canola were assumed fixed at $0.2545/lb without the
AOG and $0.2485 with the AOG which where those that were prevalent in March of 2008
(ADM).  Futures prices were assumed hedged in $US equivalent (assumes hedge applied in both
WCE Canola futures and US/Canada Exchange Rate).  Futures prices and exchange rates were
those applicable for November 2008 WCE contract and November CME Canada/US exchange
rate converted to a $US equivalent for March of 2008.  Basis values at the processor were
estimated as the spread between Velva Cash Canola and WCE nearby canola futures converted to
$US.  Basis was assumed normally distributed with means ($-0.0138/lb) and standard deviations
($0.0057/lb) derived from daily data from August, 2003 to September, 2008.  Transportation
costs representing the difference between the processor basis and the marketing region basis were
assumed to be NW ($-0.0004/lb), NC ($-0.0002/lb), NE ($-0.0005/lb) and EC ($-0.0004/lb).
13Cash prices for canola oil and meal were assumed to be current prices in March 2008
(70.56 cents/lb for canola oil and $276.85/ton (US ton) for canola meal.  Correlations between
basis levels and prediction errors for non-contract and contracted yields and oils were estimated. 
The only statistically significant correlations that exist were those for yields (non-contracted with
contracted), and oil (non-contracted with contracted) (Table 4).  These correlations were applied
to random draws from distributions for yieldsand oil content.
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There are three steps in our analytical methodology.  First, we derive the returns to
management and labor for growers and gross crushing margin for processors for each marketing
region and contracting strategy.  Second, we use stochastic simulation to iterate outcomes of
grower returns and processor gross margins for each region and contract alternative.  Third,
stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) was used to estimate certainty equivalents
that decision makers would place on a risky alternative relative to a no risk investment across a
range of Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficients.  SERF was used to determine ranks
among grower and processor choices using Simetar (Richardson, Schumann, and Feldman,
2005).  The range of absolute risk aversion coefficients (ARAC) was from 0 to 0.0363 for
growers and 0 to 0.32156 for processors where the upper bound for the ARAC was estimated
using McCarl and Bessler’s non-negativity certainty equivalent approach.  Risk premiums were
measured as the difference in certainty equivalents relative to the no contracting strategy for each
location.  The premium indicates the change that would have to occur in the certainty equivalent
of net payoffs/gross margin in order to induce a change in preferences, and can be used to infer
ranks.
Results
14A base case for growers and processors by region was developed to be representative of
the environment experienced in March of 2008.  Returns to management and labor and gross
margins for processors were simulated for each of the four alternatives by marketing region.
The resulting distributions for returns to management and labor vary by region and
contract alternative for growers (Figures 7-8).  Average grower returns to management and labor
vary by region and among the contract alternatives within regions (Table 5).  For example, the
Northwest marketing region has highest returns for the No Contract strategy, while for the
Northcentral, it is the Fixed price contract without AOG, and for the Northeast and Eastcentral,
the highest returns are for the oil premium contract.  Variability for growers measured by the
coefficient of variation generally shows similar or increasing variability for the contract
alternatives relative to the no contract alternative.  The exception to this was the Northcentral
Region where the fixed price contract with and without AOG had lower coefficients of variation.
For processors, gross crushing margins generally show a different result.  Across regions,
the fixed price contract with or without AOG had the highest average gross crushing margin. 
However, in all regions, the lowest coefficient of variation was for the oil premium contract,
followed by the fixed price contract with AOG, fixed price without AOG, and highest coefficient
of variation for the No contract alternative.
15Table 5.  Characteristics of Distribution of Returns to Management and Labor and Gross
Crushing Margin by Region.


















Mean 146 113 124 128 152 200 206 181
Std. Dev. 111 138 107 106 24 23 23 12
C.V. 0.76 1.22 0.87 0.83 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.07
Northcentral
Mean 462 500 494 466 193 216 221 190
Std. Dev. 112 111 111 116 24 22 22 12
C.V. 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.07
Northeast
Mean 482 486 480 524 232 255 260 199
Std. Dev. 111 110 110 121 24 22 22 12
C.V. 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.06
Eastcentral
Mean 323 302 296 328 196 219 226 191
Std. Dev. 111 111 110 114 24 22 23 12
C.V. 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.07
16Figure 7.  Distributions for Grower Returns to Management and Labor for Contract
Alternatives, by Region
Figure 8.  Distribution of Processor Gross Crushing Margin for Contract Alternatives, by
Region
17Certainty equivalents (Appendix Table A1) and risk premiums (Figure 9 and Appendix
Table B1) were estimated for growers and processors by region and across risk attitudes.  These
values indicate risk premiums for growers in Northwest North Dakota whose risk attitude ranged
from risk neutral to highly risk averse would prefer no contract over the three contract
alternatives.  For risk neutral growers, they would prefer no contract over the oil premium
contract by $18/a, Fixed price with AOG by $22/a and the Fixed price without AOG by $33/a. 
As growers in the Northwest become more risk averse, the preference of no contract over the oil
premium and fixed price with AOG declines so that for the most risk averse growers, they prefer
no contract over fixed price with AOG by $0.51/a and the oil premium by $3/a.  In contrast, as
growers become more risk averse, the preference for no contract over fixed price without AOG
becomes larger and increases to $251/a for the most risk averse growers.
For crushers, purchase from Northwest North Dakota under each of the three contract
alternatives would be preferred across risk neutral to highly risk averse crushers.  Crushers that
are risk neutral to slightly risk averse would prefer a fixed price contract with AOG ($54/ton),
while slightly risk averse to highly risk averse would prefer a fixed price contract without AOG.  
Crushers that are risk neutral would view the oil premium contract as the third preferred choice
($29/ton), however, as risk aversion increases, crushers would rank the oil premium contract as
second preferred contract for moderately risk aversion.  As risk aversion increases, the oil
premium contract becomes the preferred alternative with the most risk averse crushers preferring
the oil premium contract to no contract by $73/ton.
In the Northcentral region, both growers and crushers prefer the contract alternatives over
no contract for some range of risk aversion.  For growers, the fixed price contract, with and
without AOG, is preferred to the no contract alternative for all risk aversions from risk neutral to
highly risk averse.  The fixed price without AOG is more preferred over the no contract
alternative than the fixed price with AOG, with both fixed price contracts being more preferred
by highly risk averse growers ($51-$57/a) than risk neutral growers ($32-38/a).  The oil premium
contract was preferred to the no contract alternative by $4/acre for risk neutral growers, but
quickly becomes the least preferred alternative as growers become more risk averse.  For
crushers, they prefer the fixed price contract with AOG over the fixed price without AOG and
both contracts over the no contract alternative across the range of risk aversions by $23-$40/ton. 
Crushers preference for the oil premium contract varies from least preferred option for risk
neutral crushers ($-3/ton), to most preferred contract for high risk aversion ($42/ton). Thus, for
the Northcentral region, both growers and crushers prefer the fixed price with and without AOG
over the no contract alternative over a wide range of risk aversions.
In the Northeast region, risk neutral to higher risk averse growers prefer the oil premium
contract over all the other contract alternatives and the risk premiums for the oil premium
contract decline as growers become more risk averse.  Risk neutral growers would prefer the oil
premium contract over no contract by $42/a and this declines to $10/a for the most risk averse
growers.  The most risk averse growers preferred the two fixed price contracts with the fixed
price without the AOG provisions being preferred over no contract by $23/a while the fixed price
with AOG being preferred by $17/a.  The fixed price contract without AOG is preferred over the
18no contract alternative by risk neutral to highly risk averse growers.  However, the fixed price
contract with AOG is less preferred to the no contract alternative risk neutral to moderately risk
averse growers in the Northeast region.  
For processors purchasing from the Northeast, they prefer the fixed price contracts both
with and without AOG provisions over the no contract alternative by $23-$41/ton.  The
oilpremium contract, which is preferred by growers, is only preferred for moderately risk averse
to highly risk averse processors ($11/ton).  Risk neutral processors prefer the no contract
alternative over the oil premium contract by $33/ton.
In the Eastcentral region, growers largely prefer the no contract alternative over the other
contracting alternatives.  Only the oil premium contract is preferred over the no contract
alternative for risk neutral to moderately risk averse growers.  For processors in the Eastcentral,
both fixed price contracts and the oil premium contract are preferred to the no contract
alternative.  The preference among these three shifts from AOG, no AOG, oil premium for risk
neutral to moderately risk averse crushers, to AOG, oil premium and no AOG for highly risk
averse crushers.  The oil premium contract being preferred to the no contract for all risk
aversions except for the risk neutral processors.
Results across regions indicate that there are differences in preferences for contract
alternatives between growers and processors for the Northwest, Northeast and Eastcentral regions
and agreement in the Northcentral region.  This suggests that development of a single contract
that would be widely adopted across the state would likely have to be altered by region to be
acceptable to growers and processors.
19Figure 9.  Risk Premiums for Growers and Processors Relative to No Contract Alternative,
for Contract Alternatives by Region.
20Sensitivities   
Several parameters were examined to determine the sensitivity of grower and processor
preferences to adjustments in these values.  This included, 1) the value of the oil
premium/discount for the oil premium contract, 2) the discount in the fixed price contract for the
AOG provisions, 3) the premium/discount for the fixed price contracts over the current futures
price, and 4) the volume contracted.
Oil Premium/Discounts
The base case oil premium contract assumed that growers would receive a
premium/discount for percent of oil content above/below 42% equivalent to 1.5% of the futures
value.  The sensitivity of preferences for the oil premium/discount contract was examined for oil
premium/discounts ranging from 1% to 3% of futures value by 0.25% increments for each
percent of oil content above/below 42%.  Certainty equivalents for the alternative oil
premium/discounts are contained in Appendix Tables A2a-b for growers and processors.
Increasing the oil premium/discount level from 1% to 3% reduced risk premiums for
Northwest growers relative to the no contract case (Figure 10 and Appendix Tables B2a-b).  For
example, risk premiums for risk neutral growers for 1% discount were $-12/a, while increasing
the discount to 3% resulted in risk premiums of $-35/a.  Increasing risk aversion, lowered the risk
premium relative to the no contract alternative so that growers would have risk premiums of $-
2/a for 1% and $-6/a for 3% oil premium/discount.  For processors in the Northwest, the opposite
trend was observed with processors preferring higher oil premium/discount levels over lower and
processors that were more risk averse having higher risk premiums relative to no contract
alternative than for lower or risk neutral processors.  Risk premiums for the oil premium contract
by level of premium/discount for processors in the Northwest ranged from $19/ton to $93/ton.
For growers and processors in the Northeast region, results were similar but opposite in
effect.  Growers in the Northeast preferred higher premium/discounts to lower and had higher
risk premiums relative to no contract alternative for risk neutral growers and lower risk
premiums for risk averse growers.  Processors in the Northeast preferred lower
premium/discounts to higher and had more negative risk premiums relative to no contract for risk
neutral processors and slightly positive risk premiums lower premiums/discounts for risk averse
processors.
Northcentral and Eastcentral growers and processors had similar trends in responses to
changes in oil premium/discount levels.  For risk neutral growers, in either region, they would
prefer higher premiums/discounts to lower, while as risk aversion increases, preferences shift so
that lower premiums/discounts are preferred to higher.  In both regions, the range of risk
premiums from low to high premiums/discounts increases from risk neutral to highly risk averse,
with the larger range for risk averse growers in the Eastcentral region.
21For processors in the Northcentral and Eastcentral regions, the highest oil
premium/discounts are the least preferred oil premium contract for risk neutral processors and the
lowest oil premium/discounts are the most preferred oil premium contract.  However, as risk
aversion increases, the order of preference changes and for higher risk aversion levels,
premiums/discounts of 1.75% to 2% become the most preferred oil contracts with most preferred
option shifting from 1.75% to 2% as risk aversion increases.
22Figure 10.  Sensitivity of Risk Premiums for Oil Premium/Discount Contract for Levels of
Oil Premium/Discounts for Growers and Processors, by Region.
23Discount for AOG Provisions in Fixed Price Contract
The base case assumes a discount for AOG provisions of 0.6 cents/lb.  The sensitivity of
preferences and risk premiums relative to the no contract alternative were compared for AOG
discounts ranging from 0 cents/lb to 1.2 cents/lb in 0.2 cent increments.  Certainty equivalents for
alternative discounts for AOG provisions for growers and processors are contained in Appendix
Table A3a-b.
Increasing discounts by 0.2 cents/lb for growers generally reduced risk premiums by $1-
2/a for growers of all risk attitudes in all regions (Figure 11 and Appendix Table B3a-b).  In the
Northcentral and Northeast regions, increasing the discount for AOG provisions by 0.2 cents/lb
reduced risk premiums by $2/bu. and has similar affects across risk attitudes.  In the Northwest
and Eastcentral regions, growers that were risk neutral reduced risk premiums by $2/a for an
increase of 0.2 cents/lb, but as risk attitudes become more risk averse, the change in risk
premium for an increase in AOG discounts reduced so that the most risk averse growers in the
Northwest region only reduced risk premiums by about $1.3 to 0.40/a.
Increases in discounts for AOG provisions by 0.2 cents/lb for processors generally had
similar affects as growers, but opposite in direction.  Increases in discounts for AOG provisions
increased risk premiums for processors by generally $1-3/ton, for processors of all risk attitudes.  
24Figure 11.  Sensitivity of Risk Premiums to Level of Discount for AOG in Fixed Price
Contract, by Region for Growers and Processors.
25Premium/Discount for Fixed Price Relative to Futures
In the base case, the spread between the futures price (29.2 cents/lb) and the fixed price
contract (25.45 cents/lb without AOG and 24.85 cents/lb with AOG) was -3.75 cents/lb.  The
spread between the fixed price contract value and futures was examined in 2 cent/lb increments
from 4.25 cents over futures to -7.75 cents under futures to determine the sensitivity of
preferences and risk premiums relative to no contract alternative.  Certainty equivalents for the
fixed price with and without AOG provisions for alternative fixed prices are contained in
Appendix Tables A4a-d.
Decreasing the spread from 4.25 cents/lb over to -7.75 cents/lb under the futures
(reducing the amount the fixed price trades over futures or increasing the discount the fixed price
trades under futures) for the fixed price contract with and without AOG provisions reduced risk
premiums for growers relative to the no contract alternative (Figures 12-13 and Appendix Tables
B5a-d).  Effects of increasing the spread varied by region, with growers in both the Northcentral
and Northeast regions risk premiums declining by about $20/acre for each 2 cent/lb increase in
the spread between the fixed price contract and futures.  Further, this effect was consistent for the
fixed price contract with and without AOG provisions and across risk attitudes for growers in
these two regions.  However, for growers in the Northwest and Eastcentral region, the change in
risk premiums for growers for a 2 cent/lb increase in spreads declined as growers become more
risk averse with the decline larger for the fixed price contract without the AOG provisions and
for growers in the Northwest region.  The change in risk premiums for a 2 cent/lb increase in
spread for growers in the Eastcentral region declined from $20/a for risk neutral growers to about
$9/a for the most risk averse growers with NoAOG provisions and $20/a to about $12-14/acre for
the most risk averse growers with the AOG provisions.  The change in risk premiums for an
increase in spread for growers in the Northwest declined from $19/acre for risk neutral growers
to $0.5 to 0.8/acre for the most risk averse growers without the AOG provisions and to $2.36 to
5.24/acre for the most risk averse growers with the AOG provisions.
Decreasing the spread for the fixed price contract had different effects on risk premiums
for processors.  In the Northcentral and Northeast Regions, increasing the spread for risk neutral
growers increased risk premiums for processors with risk neutral processors increasing about
$15.6-15.74/ton for each 2 cents/lb increase in spread in both regions for fixed price with and
without AOG provisions.  As processors become more risk averse, the change in risk premiums
increased and also were higher for increases in spread when the change was from spreads which
traded over futures (positive spreads) than when the change was from spreads that traded at a
discount to futures (negative spreads).  Thus, the change in risk premium from a change in spread
also varied based on the initial level of spread.  Similar results occurred for processors buying
from the Northwest and Eastcentral, however two changes are prevalent.  First, for changes in
spread from levels trading over futures, risk premiums increased as risk preferences become
more risk averse, however, as initial levels of spread trade at higher levels under futures, then the
change in risk premiums decline as risk aversion increases.  This shift from increasing to
decreasing as the initial level of spread shifts from over futures to under was most prevalent for
processors in the Northwest for the fixed price contract with AOG.
26Figure 12.  Sensitivity of Risk Premium Relative to No Contract for Fixed Price Contract
Without AOG Provisions to Changes in Fixed Price Spread Relative to Futures for
Growers and Processors, by Region and Risk Attitude.
27Figure 13.  Sensitivity of Risk Premium Relative to No Contract for Fixed Price Contract
With AOG Provisions to Changes in Fixed Price Spread Relative to Futures for Growers
and Processors, by Region and Risk Attitude.
28Contracted Volume 
In the base case, it was assumed that growers were limited to contracting 1000 lbs/acre of
potential production with the remaining production assumed hedged like the no contract
alternative.  Sensitivities were conducted in 500 lb/a increments from 500 lbs/a to 2500 lbs/a to
determine preferences for growers and processors on the volume contracted and risk premiums. 
Certainty equivalents for the fixed price contracts with and without AOG provisions for different
contracted volumes are shown in Appendix Tables A5a-b for growers and processors.
Results for growers with the fixed price contract without AOG provisions prefer the 500
lbs/a contract volume to higher volumes across all regions (Figure 14 and Appendix Tables B5a-
b).  Changes in the risk premiums for the different levels of canola contracted, as risk aversion
increased vary with region and level of canola contracted.  In the Northwest, for all contract
levels, risk premiums decline as risk aversion increases.   For the Northcentral and Northeast
regions, 500-1000 bu contracted risk premiums increase as risk aversion increases, yet, for 1500-
2500 bu, risk premiums decline as risk aversion increases.  In the Eastcentral region, only the 500
bu contracted risk premiums increase as risk aversion increases.  For 1000 bu or higher, risk
premiums declined as risk aversion increased.  In contrast, processors for the fixed price contract
without AOG provisions would prefer the 2500 lbs/a volume over the others for all regions.  For
processors, risk premiums generally increased as risk aversion increased.
For the fixed price contract with AOG provisions, growers again prefer the 500 lbs/a
contract over larger volumes contracted.  Risk premiums increased and differences between
volumes contracted became less as risk aversion increased for growers in all regions. 
For processors with the fixed price contract with AOG provisions, preferences for
contracted volumes shifted by risk attitude and region.  Processors purchasing from the
Northcentral and Northeast regions preferred contracting 2500 lbs/a for risk neutral to highly risk
averse attitudes.  For processors purchasing from the Eastcentral region, processors across risk
attitudes would prefer 2000 lbs/a contract level.  For processors purchasing from the Northwest,
risk neutral to slightly risk averse processors would prefer 1500 lbs/a and as risk aversion
increases would shift to preferring contracting for 1000 lbs/a. 
29Figure 14.  Sensitivity of Risk Premiums for Fixed Price Contract Without AOG Provisions
to Volume of Canola Contracted, for Growers and Processors, by Region and Risk
Attitude.
30Figure 15.  Sensitivity of Risk Premiums for Fixed Price Contract With AOG Provisions to
Volume of Canola Contracted, For Growers and Processors, by Region and Risk Attitude.
31Summary and Implications
Canola has evolved to be an important crop in the Great Plains of the United States
during the past decade.  Canola production however is risky, and there are many competing crops
with varying risk reduction mechanisms.  Four alternative contracting strategies(no contract,
fixed price without AOG provisions, fixed price with AOG provisions, and an oil premium
contract) for growers and processors were evaluated to compare and contrast risks and risk
preferences for each of the contracting alternatives and to evaluate how risks and preferences
change across regions of North Dakota and between growers and processors.
Average returns to labor and management for growers and variability of returns varied by
region with highest returns as: Northwest No-contract, Northcentral Fixed Price without AOG,
Northeast and Eastcentral Oil premium contract.  The alternative with the lowest variability (CV)
were No- contract for Northwest, Northeast and Eastcentral and the Fixed Price with and without
AOG for the Northcentral region.  For processors, the Fixed Price with and without AOG
contract had the highest returns and the lowest variability was for the oil premium contract and
these results were consistant across regions.
Results for grower and processor risk preferences across regions indicate that there is a
difference in preferences for contract alternatives between growers and processors for the
Northwest, Northeast and Eastcentral regions and agreement in the Northcentral region.  This
suggests that development of a single contract that would be widely adopted across the state
would likely have to be altered by region to be acceptable to growers and processors.
Sensitivities indicate that preferences are sensitive to oil premiums/discounts, discounts
for AOG provisions, spread between fixed price and futures, and the volume contracted.
C Increasing oil premiums/discounts generally had opposite effects for growers and
processors.  Increasing oil premiums/discounts reduced grower premiums in the
Northwest and increased grower premiums in the Northeast while reverse occurred for
processors.  In the Northcentral and Eastcentral regions, increasing oil
premiums/discounts effects varied by risk attitude with risk neutral growers preferring
higher premiums/discounts and extremely risk averse growers preferring the lower
premiums/discounts.  Processors effects were reversed from those of growers.
C Increasing discounts for AOG provisions by 0.2 cents/lb generally reduced grower risk
premiums by about $1-2/acre and increased processor risk premiums by $1-3/ton.
C Increasing the spread between the fixed price and futures by 2 cents/lb in the
Northcentral and Northeast regions decreased grower risk premiums by $20/acre and
increased processor risk premiums by $15-16/ton.  For growers in Northwest and
Eastcentral the change in risk premiums from increasing the spread decline as growers
32become more risk averse.  For processors buying from the Northwest and Eastcentral,
the effects were reversed.
C Processors generally preferred more contracted volume than less with higher volumes
prefered in the Northcentral and Northeast regions (2500 lbs/acre) with lesser volumes
in Eastcentral (2000 lbs/acre) and Northwest (1000-1500 lbs/acre).  Growers generally
preferred lesser contracted volumes than processors.
Results are limited in that improvements in yield levels and stability of yields for seed
and/or oil will affect preferences for both growers and processors.  Further, different assumptions
on pricing of contract overages would impact preferences.
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Appendix Table A1.  Certainty Equivalents for Growers ($/A) and Processors ($/Ton) for

























Northcentral Growers Northcentral Processors
0 462 500 494 466 0 193 216 221 190
0.0061 424 462 456 426 0.0536 177 203 207 186
0.0136 376 416 410 376 0.1206 157 187 191 181
0.0212 328 370 364 325 0.1876 141 175 179 175
0.0287 279 329 323 275 0.2546 131 167 171 171
0.0363 235 293 287 230 0.3216 125 161 165 166
Northeast Growers Northeast Processors
0 482 486 480 524 0 232 255 260 199
0.0061 445 449 443 480 0.0536 216 242 247 195
0.0136 398 404 398 426 0.1206 196 226 231 190
0.0212 350 359 353 371 0.1876 180 214 218 184
0.0287 302 318 312 316 0.2546 170 206 210 179
0.0363 260 283 277 269 0.3216 164 201 205 175
Northwest Growers Northwest Processors
0 146 113 124 128 0 152 200 206 181
0.0061 109 40 90 95 0.0536 136 186 191 177
0.0136 64 -85 51 54 0.1206 116 169 173 171
0.0212 24 -184 16 17 0.1876 100 155 160 166
0.0287 -11 -248 -14 -15 0.2546 90 147 152 161
0.0363 -38 -289 -39 -41 0.3216 84 141 147 157
Eastcentral Growers Eastcentral  Processors
0 323 302 296 328 0 196 219 226 191
0.0061 286 263 260 289 0.0536 180 206 212 187
0.0136 239 202 215 241 0.1206 160 190 195 181
0.0212 191 116 173 191 0.1876 144 177 183 176
0.0287 143 38 135 142 0.2546 134 169 174 171
0.0363 101 -16 103 99 0.3216 128 163 168 167
36Appendix Table A2a.  Certainty Equivalents for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of
Premium/Discount for Oil Premiums.
Oil Premium/Discount Level 
ARAC No
Contract
1.0% 1.25% 1.5% 1.75% 2.0% 2.25% 2.5% 2.75% 3.0%
Northcentral Growers
0 462 464 465 466 466 467 468 468 469 470
0.0061 424 425 425 426 426 426 426 426 426 426
0.0136 376 376 376 376 376 375 375 374 374 373
0.0212 328 326 326 325 325 324 323 323 322 321
0.0287 279 276 276 275 274 273 273 272 271 270
0.0363 235 232 231 230 230 229 228 227 226 225
Northeast Growers
0 482 510 517 524 531 538 545 552 559 566
0.0061 445 469 474 480 486 492 497 503 508 514
0.0136 398 417 422 426 430 434 439 442 446 450
0.0212 350 364 367 371 374 376 379 382 385 387
0.0287 302 312 314 316 318 320 322 324 325 327
0.0363 260 266 268 269 271 272 273 275 276 278
Northwest Growers
0 146 134 131 128 125 122 119 116 114 111
0.0061 109 99 97 95 92 90 87 85 82 79
0.0136 64 58 56 54 52 50 48 46 45 43
0.0212 24 19 18 17 15 14 13 12 10 9
0.0287 -11 -14 -14 -15 -16 -17 -18 -18 -19 -20
0.0363 -38 -40 -40 -41 -41 -42 -42 -43 -44 -44
Eastcentral Growers
0 323 327 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334
0.0061 286 288 289 289 290 290 291 291 291 292
0.0136 239 240 241 241 241 241 241 241 241 240
0.0212 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 190 190
0.0287 143 143 142 142 142 142 142 141 141 141
0.0363 101 100 99 99 99 98 98 98 97 97
37Appendix Table A2b.  Certainty Equivalents for Processors ($/Ton) for Different Levels of
Premium/Discount for Oil Premiums.
Oil Premium/Discount Level 
ARAC No
Contract
1.0% 1.25% 1.5% 1.75% 2.0% 2.25% 2.5% 2.75% 3.0%
Northcentral Processors
0 193 191 191 190 190 189 188 188 187 187
0.0536 177 185 186 186 186 186 185 183 182 180
0.1206 157 177 179 181 181 181 180 178 175 171
0.1876 141 169 173 175 177 177 176 173 169 163
0.2546 131 162 167 171 172 173 172 169 163 156
0.3216 125 157 163 166 168 169 168 165 159 151
Northeast Processors
0 232 210 205 199 193 188 182 177 171 166
0.0536 216 204 199 195 190 184 178 172 166 158
0.1206 196 196 193 190 185 180 174 167 159 150
0.1876 180 188 187 184 181 176 169 162 153 142
0.2546 170 181 181 179 176 171 165 157 147 135
0.3216 164 176 177 175 172 168 162 153 142 130
Northwest Processors
0 152 171 176 181 185 190 195 200 205 209
0.0536 136 165 171 177 182 187 191 195 199 202
0.1206 116 157 164 171 177 182 187 190 192 194
0.1876 100 149 158 166 173 178 182 185 186 186
0.2546 90 142 153 161 168 174 178 180 180 179
0.3216 84 137 148 157 164 170 175 177 176 174
Eastcentral Processors
0 196 193 192 191 190 189 188 187 186 185
0.0536 180 186 187 187 186 185 184 183 181 178
0.1206 160 178 180 181 182 181 180 177 174 170
0.1876 144 170 174 176 177 177 175 172 168 162
0.2546 134 164 168 171 172 173 171 168 162 155
0.3216 128 158 164 167 168 169 168 164 157 150
38Appendix Table A3a.  Certainty Equivalents for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of
Discounts for Fixed Price With AOG Provisions.


















0 462 500 498 496 494 492 490 488
0.0061 424 462 460 458 456 454 452 450
0.0136 376 416 414 412 410 408 406 404
0.0212 328 370 368 366 364 362 360 358
0.0287 279 329 327 325 323 321 319 317
0.0363 235 293 291 289 287 285 283 281
Northeast Growers
0 482 486 484 482 480 478 476 474
0.0061 445 449 447 445 443 441 439 437
0.0136 398 404 402 400 398 396 394 392
0.0212 350 359 357 355 353 351 349 347
0.0287 302 318 316 314 312 310 308 306
0.0363 260 283 281 279 277 275 273 271
Northwest Growers
0 146 130 128 126 124 122 120 118
0.0061 109 95 94 92 90 88 87 85
0.0136 64 55 54 52 51 50 48 47
0.0212 24 19 18 17 16 15 14 13
0.0287 -11 -12 -13 -13 -14 -15 -15 -16
0.0363 -38 -38 -38 -38 -39 -39 -40 -40
Eastcentral Growers
0 323 302 300 298 296 294 292 290
0.0061 286 266 264 262 260 256 256 254
0.0136 239 221 219 217 215 213 211 209
0.0212 191 178 176 174 173 171 169 167
0.0287 143 139 138 136 135 133 132 130
0.0363 101 107 105 104 103 101 100 98
39Appendix Table A3b.  Certainty Equivalents for Processors ($/Ton) for Different Levels of
Discount for Fixed Price With AOG Provisions.


















0 193 216 218 219 221 222 224 225
0.0536 177 203 204 206 207 209 210 212
0.1206 157 187 188 190 191 193 194 196
0.1876 141 175 176 178 179 181 182 183
0.2546 131 167 168 170 171 172 174 175
0.3216 125 161 163 164 165 167 168 169
Northeast Processors
0 232 255 257 258 260 262 263 265
0.0536 216 242 244 245 247 248 250 251
0.1206 196 226 228 229 231 232 233 235
0.1876 180 214 216 217 218 220 221 223
0.2546 170 206 208 209 210 212 213 214
0.3216 164 201 202 203 205 206 207 209
Northwest Processors
0 152 197 200 203 206 209 212 215
0.0536 136 183 186 189 191 194 196 199
0.1206 116 167 169 171 173 175 177 179
0.1876 100 154 156 158 160 162 164 166
0.2546 90 146 148 150 152 154 156 158
0.3216 84 141 143 145 147 149 151 153
Eastcentral Processors
0 196 219 221 223 226 228 230 232
0.0536 180 206 208 210 212 214 216 218
0.1206 160 190 191 193 195 197 199 200
0.1876 144 177 179 181 183 184 186 188
0.2546 134 169 171 172 174 176 178 179
0.3216 128 163 165 167 168 170 172 174
40Appendix Table A4a.  Certainty Equivalents for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of Fixed
Price Spreads Over Futures, Fixed Price Without AOG.

























0 462 580 560 540 520 500 480 460
0.0061 424 542 522 502 482 462 442 422
0.0136 376 496 476 456 436 416 396 376
0.0212 328 450 430 410 390 370 350 330
0.0287 279 409 389 369 349 329 309 289
0.0363 235 373 353 333 313 293 273 253
Northeast Growers
0 482 566 546 526 506 486 466 446
0.0061 445 529 509 489 469 449 429 409
0.0136 398 484 464 444 424 404 384 364
0.0212 350 439 419 399 379 359 339 319
0.0287 302 398 378 358 338 318 298 278
0.0363 260 363 343 323 303 283 263 243
Northwest Growers
0 146 188 169 150 132 113 94 75
0.0061 109 97 83 69 54 40 25 10
0.0136 64 -63 -68 -73 -79 -85 -92 -99
0.0212 24 -176 -178 -180 -182 -184 -187 -190
0.0287 -11 -244 -244 -245 -246 -248 -249 -250
0.0363 -38 -287 -287 -288 -288 -289 -290 -291
Eastcentral Growers
0 323 382 362 342 322 302 282 262
0.0061 286 342 323 303 283 263 244 224
0.0136 239 272 255 237 220 202 185 167
0.0212 191 164 152 141 128 116 103 89
0.0287 143 78 68 58 48 38 28 17
0.0363 101 22 13 3 -6 -16 -25 -35
41Appendix Table A4b.  Certainty Equivalents for Processors ($/Ton) for Different Levels of
Fixed Price Spreads Over Futures, Fixed Price Without AOG.

























0 193 153 169 185 200 216 232 248
0.0536 177 139 156 172 187 203 218 233
0.1206 157 123 141 157 172 187 201 215
0.1876 141 112 129 146 161 175 189 202
0.2546 131 104 122 138 153 167 180 194
0.3216 125 99 117 133 148 161 175 188
Northeast Processors
0 232 193 209 224 240 255 271 287
0.0536 216 179 195 211 227 242 257 272
0.1206 196 163 180 196 212 226 240 254
0.1876 180 152 169 185 200 214 228 241
0.2546 170 144 162 178 192 206 220 233
0.3216 164 139 157 173 187 201 214 227
Northwest Processors
0 152 73 105 137 168 200 232 263
0.0536 136 54 90 124 156 186 213 238
0.1206 116 35 73 110 142 169 192 213
0.1876 100 20 60 98 131 155 177 198
0.2546 90 11 51 90 123 147 169 189
0.3216 84 5 45 85 118 141 163 184
Eastcentral Processors
0 196 134 155 176 198 219 241 262
0.0536 180 115 141 164 185 206 225 244
0.1206 160 93 124 149 171 190 208 225
0.1876 144 78 112 138 159 177 194 211
0.2546 134 70 105 131 151 169 186 202
0.3216 128 64 100 126 146 163 180 197
42Appendix Table A4c.  Certainty Equivalents for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of Fixed
Price Spreads Over Futures, Fixed Price With AOG.

























0 462 574 554 534 514 494 474 454
0.0061 424 536 516 496 476 456 436 416
0.0136 376 490 470 450 430 410 390 370
0.0212 328 444 424 404 384 364 344 324
0.0287 279 403 383 363 343 323 303 283
0.0363 235 367 347 327 307 287 267 247
Northeast Growers
0 482 560 540 520 500 480 460 440
0.0061 445 523 503 483 463 443 423 403
0.0136 398 478 458 438 418 398 378 358
0.0212 350 433 413 393 373 353 333 313
0.0287 302 392 372 352 332 312 292 272
0.0363 260 357 337 317 297 277 257 237
Northwest Growers
0 146 199 180 162 143 124 105 86
0.0061 109 157 141 124 107 90 73 56
0.0136 64 101 89 77 64 51 37 23
0.0212 24 48 41 34 25 16 6 -5
0.0287 -11 6 2 -3 -8 -14 -21 -28
0.0363 -38 -27 -29 -32 -35 -39 -43 -48
Eastcentral Growers
0 323 376 256 336 316 296 276 257
0.0061 286 339 319 300 280 260 240 220
0.0136 239 292 273 253 234 215 196 176
0.0212 191 242 225 208 190 173 155 136
0.0287 143 193 179 165 150 135 119 102
0.0363 101 152 141 128 116 103 89 74
43Appendix Table A4d.  Certainty Equivalents for Processors ($/Ton) for Different Levels of
Fixed Price Spreads Over Futures, Fixed Price With AOG.

























0 193 158 174 189 205 221 237 252
0.0536 177 144 161 176 192 207 222 237
0.1206 157 129 146 161 177 191 205 219
0.1876 141 117 134 150 165 179 193 206
0.2546 131 110 127 143 157 171 184 198
0.3216 125 105 122 138 152 165 179 192
Northeast Processors
0 232 198 213 229 244 260 276 291
0.0536 216 184 200 216 231 247 261 276
0.1206 196 168 185 201 216 231 245 258
0.1876 180 157 174 190 204 218 232 245
0.2546 170 150 167 182 197 210 224 237
0.3216 164 145 162 177 191 205 218 231
Northwest Processors
0 152 89 118 147 177 206 235 264
0.0536 136 72 104 135 164 191 215 236
0.1206 116 54 89 121 150 173 190 199
0.1876 100 41 77 110 138 160 175 180
0.2546 90 33 70 103 130 152 166 171
0.3216 84 28 65 98 125 147 160 164
Eastcentral Processors
0 196 140 162 183 204 226 247 268
0.0536 180 124 148 171 192 212 231 250
0.1206 160 105 133 156 176 195 213 229
0.1876 144 92 121 145 165 183 199 216
0.2546 134 84 114 137 157 174 191 207
0.3216 128 78 108 132 151 168 185 202
44Appendix Table A5a.  Certainty Equivalents for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of
Production Contracted per Acre (lbs/a).
























0 462 512 500 488 473 436 509 494 479 465 453
0.0061 424 474 462 450 424 344 471 456 442 428 419
0.0136 376 427 416 397 322 193 424 410 396 385 380
0.0212 328 328 370 327 205 69 379 364 352 345 343
0.0287 279 339 329 256 123 -12 336 323 312 309 308
0.0363 235 303 293 203 69 -65 300 287 279 277 277
Northeast Growers
0 482 498 486 474 460 424 495 480 465 450 438
0.0061 445 461 449 437 412 337 458 443 428 415 406
0.0136 398 415 404 386 317 190 412 398 383 372 367
0.0212 350 370 359 321 202 68 367 353 340 333 331
0.0287 302 329 318 252 121 -13 326 312 301 297 297
0.0363 260 292 283 200 68 -65 289 277 268 266 266
Northwest Growers
0 146 139 113 40 -80 -216 137 124 116 114 114
0.0061 109 97 40 -77 -212 -349 101 90 86 85 85
0.0136 64 29 -85 -221 -359 -496 58 51 49 49 49
0.0212 24 -50 -184 -322 -460 -579 19 16 16 16 16
0.0287 -11 -110 -248 -385 -523 -662 -13 -14 -14 -14 -14
0.0363 -38 -151 -289 -427 -565 -704 -38 -39 -39 -39 -39
Eastcentral Growers
0 323 314 302 284 232 126 311 296 282 272 269
0.0061 286 277 263 226 128 -5 274 260 247 240 239
0.0136 239 231 202 106 -27 -164 229 215 206 203 202
0.0212 191 186 116 -14 -150 -285 184 173 167 166 166
0.0287 143 142 38 -96 -230 -364 143 135 132 132 132
0.0363 101 104 -16 -149 -283 -416 108 103 102 102 102
45Appendix Table A5b.  Certainty Equivalents for Processors ($/ton) for Different Levels of
Production Contracted per Acre (lbs/a).
























0 193 207 216 225 234 241 209 221 232 243 250
0.0536 177 193 203 212 222 229 195 207 219 230 238
0.1206 157 176 187 197 206 214 179 191 203 214 223
0.1876 141 164 175 185 194 202 167 179 191 202 210
0.2546 131 156 167 177 185 193 158 171 183 193 202
0.3216 125 151 161 171 180 187 153 165 177 187 196
Northeast Growers
0 232 246 255 265 274 281 248 260 272 283 289
0.0536 216 232 242 252 261 268 234 247 258 269 277
0.1206 196 216 226 236 245 253 218 231 242 253 262
0.1876 180 204 214 224 233 241 206 218 230 241 250
0.2546 170 196 206 216 224 232 198 210 222 232 241
0.3216 164 190 201 210 219 226 192 205 216 226 235
Northwest Growers
0 152 183 200 208 210 210 188 206 208 200 192
0.0536 136 169 186 196 198 198 173 191 192 184 178
0.1206 116 152 169 181 184 185 156 173 173 166 161
0.1876 100 139 155 168 173 173 143 160 158 152 148
0.2546 90 130 147 159 165 165 134 152 149 143 139
0.3216 84 125 141 153 160 160 128 147 143 137 133
Eastcentral Growers
0 196 207 219 231 239 241 210 226 239 244 240
0.0536 180 193 206 218 226 229 196 212 226 232 226
0.1206 160 176 190 202 221 216 179 195 209 216 210
0.1876 144 164 177 189 198 204 167 183 196 204 198
0.2546 134 156 169 180 190 196 159 174 188 196 190
0.3216 128 151 163 175 184 191 153 168 182 191 184
46Appendix Table B1.  Risk Premiums for Growers ($/A) and Processors ($/Ton) for Contract


























Northcentral Growers Northcentral Processors
0 0 38 32 4 0 0 23 27 -3
0.0061 0 38 32 2 0.0536 0 25 30 9
0.0136 0 39 33 0 0.1206 0 30 34 23
0.0212 0 43 37 -2 0.1876 0 34 38 34
0.0287 0 50 44 -4 0.2546 0 36 40 39
0.0363 0 57 51 -5 0.3216 0 36 41 42
Northeast Growers Northeast Processors
0 0 4 -2 42 0 0 23 28 -33
0.0061 0 4 -2 36 0.0536 0 26 30 -21
0.0136 0 5 -1 28 0.1206 0 30 34 -7
0.0212 0 9 3 20 0.1876 0 34 38 4
0.0287 0 16 10 14 0.2546 0 36 40 9
0.0363 0 23 17 10 0.3216 0 37 41 11
Northwest Growers Northwest Processors
0 0 -33 -22 -18 0 0 48 54 29
0.0061 0 -69 -19 -15 0.0536 0 50 55 40
0.0136 0 -149 -13 -10 0.1206 0 53 57 55
0.0212 0 -208 -7 -7 0.1876 0 55 60 66
0.0287 0 -237 -3 -4 0.2546 0 57 62 71
0.0363 0 -251 -1 -3 0.3216 0 57 63 73
Eastcentral Growers Eastcentral  Processors
0 0 -21 -27 5 0 0 23 29 -5
0.0061 0 -23 -26 3 0.0536 0 26 32 6
0.0136 0 -37 -24 1 0.1206 0 30 35 21
0.0212 0 -76 -19 0 0.1876 0 33 38 32
0.0287 0 -105 -9 -1 0.2546 0 35 40 37
0.0363 0 -116 2 -2 0.3216 0 36 41 39
47Appendix Table B2a.  Risk Premiums for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of
Premium/Discount for Oil Premiums Relative to No Contract Alternative.
Oil Premium/Discount Level 
ARAC No
Contract
1.0% 1.25% 1.5% 1.75% 2.0% 2.25% 2.5% 2.75% 3.0%
Northcentral Growers
0 0 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 7 8
0.0061 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.0136 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4
0.0212 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7
0.0287 0 -2 -3 -4 -5 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
0.0363 0 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -9 -10
Northeast Growers
0 0 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77 85
0.0061 0 24 30 36 41 47 52 58 63 69
0.0136 0 19 23 28 32 36 40 44 48 52
0.0212 0 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 34 37
0.0287 0 9 11 14 16 17 19 21 23 25
0.0363 0 7 8 10 11 12 14 15 17 18
Northwest Growers
0 0 -12 -15 -18 -21 -24 -27 -29 -32 -35
0.0061 0 -10 -12 -15 -20 -20 -22 -25 -27 -30
0.0136 0 -7 -9 -10 -12 -14 -16 -18 -20 -22
0.0212 0 -4 -6 -7 -8 -9 -11 -12 -13 -15
0.0287 0 -3 -4 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -8 -9
0.0363 0 -2 -2 -2 -3 -4 -4 -5 -5 -6
Eastcentral Growers
0 0 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0.0061 0 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 6
0.0136 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
0.0212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1
0.0287 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -3
0.0363 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3
48Appendix Table B2b.  Risk Premiums for Processors ($/Ton) for Different Levels of
Premium/Discount for Oil Premiums Relative to No Contract Alternative.
Oil Premium/Discount Level 
ARAC No
Contract
1.0% 1.25% 1.5% 1.75% 2.0% 2.25% 2.5% 2.75% 3.0%
Northcentral Processors
0 0 -2 -3 -3 -4 -4 -5 -6 -6 -7
0.0536 0 7 8 9 9 8 7 6 4 2
0.1206 0 19 22 23 24 24 23 21 18 14
0.1876 0 27 31 34 35 35 34 31 27 22
0.2546 0 31 36 39 41 41 40 37 32 25
0.3216 0 32 38 42 43 44 43 40 34 26
Northeast Processors
0 0 -22 -28 -33 -39 -45 -50 -56 -61 -67
0.0536 0 -13 -17 -21 -27 -32 -38 -44 -51 -58
0.1206 0 -1 -3 -7 -11 -16 -23 -30 -38 -46
0.1876 0 7 6 4 0 -5 -11 -19 -28 -38
0.2546 0 11 11 9 6 1 -5 -13 -23 -35
0.3216 0 12 13 11 8 4 -2 -10 -22 -34
Northwest Processors
0 0 19 24 29 33 38 43 48 52 57
0.0536 0 29 35 40 46 51 55 59 63 66
0.1206 0 41 48 55 61 66 70 74 76 78
0.1876 0 49 58 66 72 78 82 85 86 86
0.2546 0 52 63 71 78 84 88 90 90 89
0.3216 0 53 65 73 80 87 91 93 92 90
Eastcentral Processors
0 0 -4 -5 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10 -11
0.0536 0 6 6 6 6 5 4 3 1 -2
0.1206 0 18 20 21 22 21 19 17 14 10
0.1876 0 26 30 32 33 33 31 28 23 18
0.2546 0 30 34 37 38 38 37 34 28 21
0.3216 0 31 36 39 41 41 40 36 30 22
49Appendix Table B3a.  Risk Premiums for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of Discounts for
Fixed Price With AOG Provisions Relative to No Contract Alternative.


















0 0 38 36 34 32 30 28 26
0.0061 0 38 36 34 32 30 28 26
0.0136 0 39 37 35 33 31 29 27
0.0212 0 43 41 39 37 35 33 31
0.0287 0 50 48 46 44 42 40 38
0.0363 0 57 55 53 51 49 47 45
Northeast Growers
0 0 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8
0.0061 0 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8
0.0136 0 5 3 1 -1 -3 -5 -7
0.0212 0 9 7 5 3 1 -1 -3
0.0287 0 16 14 12 10 8 6 4
0.0363 0 23 21 19 17 15 13 11
Northwest Growers
0 0 -16 -18 -20 -22 -24 -26 -28
0.0061 0 -14 -16 -17 -19 -21 -22 -24
0.0136 0 -9 -11 -12 -13 -15 -16 -17
0.0212 0 -5 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9 -10
0.0287 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4 -4 -5
0.0363 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -2
Eastcentral Growers
0 0 -21 -23 -25 -27 -29 -31 -33
0.0061 0 -20 -22 -24 -26 -28 -30 -32
0.0136 0 -19 -20 -22 -24 -26 -28 -30
0.0212 0 -13 -15 -17 -19 -20 -22 -24
0.0287 0 -4 -5 -7 -9 -10 -12 -13
0.0363 0 6 5 3 2 1 -1 -2
50Appendix Table B3b.  Risk Premiums for Processors ($/Ton) for Different Levels of Discount
for Fixed Price with AOG Provisions Relative to No Contract Alternative.


















0 0 23 24 26 27 29 30 32
0.0536 0 25 27 28 30 31 33 34
0.1206 0 30 31 32 34 35 37 38
0.1876 0 34 35 36 38 39 40 42
0.2546 0 36 37 38 40 41 42 44
0.3216 0 36 38 39 41 42 43 45
Northeast Processors
0 0 23 24 26 28 29 31 32
0.0536 0 26 27 29 30 32 33 35
0.1206 0 30 31 33 34 36 37 38
0.1876 0 34 35 37 38 39 41 42
0.2546 0 36 37 39 40 41 43 44
0.3216 0 37 38 39 41 42 43 45
Northwest Processors
0 0 45 48 51 54 57 60 63
0.0536 0 47 50 53 55 58 60 63
0.1206 0 51 53 55 57 59 61 63
0.1876 0 54 56 58 60 62 64 66
0.2546 0 56 58 60 62 64 66 68
0.3216 0 57 59 61 63 65 67 69
Eastcentral Processors
0 0 23 24 26 28 29 31 32
0.0536 0 26 27 29 30 32 33 35
0.1206 0 30 31 33 34 36 37 38
0.1876 0 34 35 37 38 39 41 42
0.2546 0 36 37 39 40 41 43 44
0.3216 0 37 38 39 41 42 43 45
51Appendix Table B4a.  Risk Premiums for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of Fixed Price
Spreads over Futures, Fixed Price Without AOG Relative to No Contract Alternative.

























0 0 118 98 78 58 38 18 -2
0.0061 0 118 98 78 58 38 18 -2
0.0136 0 119 99 79 59 39 19 -1
0.0212 0 123 103 83 63 43 23 3
0.0287 0 130 110 90 70 50 30 10
0.0363 0 137 117 97 77 57 37 17
Northeast Growers
0 0 84 64 44 24 4 -16 -36
0.0061 0 84 64 44 24 4 -16 -36
0.0136 0 85 65 45 25 5 -15 -35
0.0212 0 89 69 49 29 9 -11 -31
0.0287 0 96 76 56 36 16 -4 -24
0.0363 0 103 83 63 43 23 3 -17
Northwest Growers
0 0 42 23 5 -14 -33 -52 -71
0.0061 0 -12 -26 -40 -55 -69 -84 -99
0.0136 0 -127 -132 -138 -143 -149 -156 -163
0.0212 0 -199 -201 -203 -206 -208 -210 -213
0.0287 0 -233 -234 -235 -236 -237 -238 -239
0.0363 0 -249 -249 -250 -250 -251 -252 -252
Eastcentral Growers
0 0 59 39 19 -1 -21 -41 -61
0.0061 0 56 37 17 -3 -23 -42 -62
0.0136 0 32 15 -2 -19 -37 -55 -73
0.0212 0 -27 -39 -51 -63 -76 -88 -102
0.0287 0 -65 -75 -85 -95 -105 -116 -126
0.0363 0 -79 -88 -97 -107 -116 -126 -136
52Appendix Table B4b.  Risk Premiums for Processors ($/Ton) for Different Levels of Fixed
Price Spreads over Futures, Fixed Price Without AOG Relative to No Contract Alternative.

























0 0 -40 -25 -9 7 23 38 54
0.0536 0 -38 -22 -6 10 25 40 55
0.1206 0 -34 -17 -1 15 30 44 58
0.1876 0 -30 -12 4 19 34 47 61
0.2546 0 -27 -9 7 22 36 49 62
0.3216 0 -26 -8 8 23 36 50 63
Northeast Processors
0 0 -39 -24 -8 7 23 39 54
0.0536 0 -37 -21 -5 10 26 41 55
0.1206 0 -33 -16 0 15 30 44 58
0.1876 0 -29 -11 5 20 34 48 61
0.2546 0 -26 -9 7 22 36 49 63
0.3216 0 -25 -7 9 23 37 50 63
Northwest Processors
0 0 -79 -47 -16 16 48 80 111
0.0536 0 -82 -46 -12 20 50 77 102
0.1206 0 -82 -43 -6 26 53 76 97
0.1876 0 -80 -40 -2 31 55 77 98
0.2546 0 -79 -39 0 33 57 79 99
0.3216 0 -78 -38 1 34 57 80 100
Eastcentral Processors
0 0 -63 -41 -20 2 23 45 66
0.0536 0 -65 -39 -16 5 26 45 64
0.1206 0 -67 -36 -11 10 30 47 64
0.1876 0 -66 -32 -6 15 33 50 67
0.2546 0 -64 -29 -3 17 35 52 68
0.3216 0 -64 -28 -2 18 36 53 69
53Appendix Table B4c.  Risk Premiums for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of Fixed Price
Spreads over Futures, Fixed Price With AOG Relative to No Contract Alternative.

























0 0 112 92 72 52 32 12 -8
0.0061 0 112 92 72 52 32 12 -8
0.0136 0 113 93 73 53 33 13 -7
0.0212 0 117 97 77 57 37 17 -3
0.0287 0 124 104 84 64 44 24 4
0.0363 0 131 111 91 71 51 31 11
Northeast Growers
0 0 78 58 38 18 -2 -22 -42
0.0061 0 78 58 38 18 -2 -22 -42
0.0136 0 79 59 39 19 -1 -21 -41
0.0212 0 83 63 43 23 3 -17 -37
0.0287 0 90 70 50 30 10 -10 -30
0.0363 0 97 77 57 37 17 -3 -23
Northwest Growers
0 0 53 34 16 -3 -22 -41 -59
0.0061 0 48 32 15 -2 -19 -36 -53
0.0136 0 37 25 13 0 -13 -27 -41
0.0212 0 25 18 10 2 -7 -17 -28
0.0287 0 16 13 8 3 -3 -10 -17
0.0363 0 12 9 6 3 -1 -5 -10
Eastcentral Growers
0 0 53 33 13 -7 -27 -47 -67
0.0061 0 53 33 14 -6 -26 -46 -66
0.0136 0 52 33 14 -5 -24 -44 -63
0.0212 0 50 34 16 -1 -19 -37 -55
0.0287 0 50 36 22 7 -9 -24 -41
0.0363 0 52 40 28 15 2 -12 -26
54Appendix Table B4d.  Risk Premiums for Processors ($/Ton) for Different Levels of Fixed
Price Spreads over Futures, Fixed Price With AOG Relative to No Contract Alternative.

























0 0 -36 -20 -4 12 27 43 59
0.0536 0 -33 -17 -1 15 30 45 60
0.1206 0 -29 -12 4 19 34 48 62
0.1876 0 -24 -7 9 24 38 51 65
0.2546 0 -21 -4 11 26 40 53 66
0.3216 0 -20 -3 13 27 41 54 67
Northeast Processors
0 0 -35 -19 -4 12 28 43 59
0.0536 0 -32 -16 0 15 30 45 60
0.1206 0 -28 -11 5 20 34 48 62
0.1876 0 -23 -6 9 24 38 52 65
0.2546 0 -21 -4 12 26 40 53 66
0.3216 0 -19 -2 13 27 41 54 67
Northwest Processors
0 0 -63 -34 -5 24 54 83 112
0.0536 0 -64 -32 -1 28 55 79 100
0.1206 0 -62 -27 5 34 57 74 83
0.1876 0 -59 -23 10 38 60 75 80
0.2546 0 -57 -20 13 40 62 76 80
0.3216 0 -55 -19 15 41 63 77 81
Eastcentral Processors
0 0 -56 -35 -13 8 29 51 72
0.0536 0 -56 -32 -10 11 32 51 69
0.1206 0 -55 -27 -4 16 35 53 69
0.1876 0 -53 -23 1 21 38 55 71
0.2546 0 -51 -20 3 23 40 57 73
0.3216 0 -49 -19 5 24 41 58 74
55Appendix Table B5a.  Risk Premiums for Growers ($/A) for Different Levels of Production
Contracted per Acre (lbs/a) Relative to No Contract Alternative.
























0 0 50 38 26 11 -26 47 32 17 3 -9
0.0061 0 50 38 26 0 -80 47 32 18 4 -5
0.0136 0 51 39 20 -54 -184 48 33 19 8 4
0.0212 0 54 43 0 -123 -259 51 37 25 17 15
0.0287 0 60 50 -23 -156 -291  57 44 33 30 30
0.0363 0 67 57 -32 -166 -301 64 51 43 42 42
Northeast Growers
0 0 16 4 -8 -22 -57 13 -2 -17 -31 -43
0.0061 0 16 4 -8 -32 -108 13 -2 -16 -30 -39
0.0136 0 17 5 -12 -82 -208 14 -1 -15 -26 -31
0.0212 0 20 9 -30 -148 -282 17 3 -10 -18 -20
0.0287 0 26 16 -50 -181 -315 23 10 -1 -5 -6
0.0363 0 33 23 -60 -192 -325 30 17 9 7 7
Northwest Growers
0 0 -7 -33 -105 -226 -362 -9 -22 -30 -31 -32
0.0061 0 -12 -69 -186 -321 -459 -8 -19 -23 -24 -24
0.0136 0 -35 -149 -286 -423 -560 -7 -13 -15 -15 -15
0.0212 0 -73 -208 -345 -483 -621 -4 -7 -8 -8 -8
0.0287 0 -99 -237 -374 -512 -651 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3
0.0363 0 -113 -251 -389 -527 -665 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
Eastcentral Growers
0 0 -9 -21 -39 -91 -197 -12 -27 -41 -51 -55
0.0061 0 -9 -23 -60 -158 -291 -12 -26 -39 -45 -47
0.0136 0 -8 -37 -133 -266 -403 -11 -24 -33 -36 -37
0.0212 0 -6 -76 -206 -341 -477 -7 -19 -24 -25 -25
0.0287 0 -1 -105 -239 -373 -508 0 -9 -11 -11 -11
0.0363 0 4 -116 -250 -383 -517 7 2 1 1 1
56Appendix Table B5b.  Risk Premiums for Processors ($/ton) for Different Levels of
Production Contracted per Acre (lbs/a) Relative to No Contract Alternative.
























0 0 13 23 32 41 48 16 27 39 50 56
0.0536 0 15 25 35 44 52 18 30 42 53 60
0.1206 0 19 30 39 49 57 21 34 46 57 65
0.1876 0 23 34 43 52 60 25 38 49 60 69
0.2546 0 25 36 45 54 61 27 40 51 62 71
0.3216 0 26 36 46 55 62 28 41 52 62 71
Northeast Growers
0 0 14 23 32 41 48 16 28 39 50 57
0.0536 0 16 26 35 44 52 18 30 42 63 61
0.1206 0 19 30 40 49 57 22 34 46 57 66
0.1876 0 23 34 44 52 60 25 38 50 60 69
0.2546 0 25 36 46 54 62 27 40 51 62 71
0.3216 0 26 37 46 55 62 28 41 52 63 72
Northwest Growers
0 0 31 48 56 58 58 36 54 55 48 40
0.0536 0 33 50 60 62 62 37 55 56 48 42
0.1206 0 35 53 65 68 68 39 57 57 50 45
0.1876 0 39 55 68 73 73 42 60 58 52 47
0.2546 0 40 57 69 75 75 44 62 59 53 49
0.3216 0 41 57 70 76 76 45 63 59 53 50
Eastcentral Growers
0 0 10 23 35 42 45 14 29 43 48 43
0.0536 0 13 26 38 46 49 16 32 46 52 46
0.1206 0 16 30 42 51 55 19 35 49 56 50
0.1876 0 20 33 45 54 60 23 38 52 60 54
0.2546 0 22 35 46 56 62 25 40 54 62 56
0.3216 0 23 36 47 56 63 25 41 54 64 57
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